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The Illusion of the Given and Its Role 
in Vision Research
A Commentary on Heiko Hecht
Axel Kohler
Illusions in vision and other modalities are  captivating displays of  the virtual
nature of our subjective world. For this reason, illusions have been an important
subject of scientific and artistic endeavors. In his target article, Heiko Hecht dis-
cusses the utility of the illusion concept and arrives at the negative conclusion
that the traditional understanding of illusions as a discrepancy between world
and perception is misguided. In his opinion, the more interesting and revealing
cases are when the discrepancy is noticed and accompanies the perceptual state,
or when, in the cognitive domain, the discrepancies become exceedingly large, but
go unnoticed nonetheless. In this commentary, I argue that Hecht’s criticism of the
illusion  concept  is  interesting  and deserves  further  study.  But  at  the  current
stage, I don’t see that the model captures the essential features of illusory states.
The processes on which Hecht focuses can be considered metacognitive appraisals
of the respective sensory events, an interesting topic by itself. In the second part
and as an overview, I review how research on the classical apparent-motion illu-
sion has shaped our understanding of the neural underpinnings of motion percep-
tion and consciousness in general.
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1 Illusions in science and culture
A main staple of research in cognitive science
and especially vision science has been, and still
is, the investigation of illusions. For one, it is
just  an  amazing  fact  that  although  we  think
that our experience of the world is direct, we
live by a subjective model of our environment.
We feel that we perceive the world as it is, a
naïve realism as we might call  it,  but we are
just not aware that the world is only presented
to us as a (re-)construction of our nervous sys-
tem.  In more philosophical  terms,  this  funda-
mental property of our experience has been re-
ferred to as “phenomenal transparency” (Met-
zinger 2003a),  the  inability  to  recognize  that
our  mental  states  are  representations.  This  is
probably the reason why we are baffled in cases
when the subjective character of our perception
becomes  evident,  although  this  rarely  occurs
under natural conditions.
At least in the context of our modern cul-
ture, many people will have had the experience
that their train is leaving the station when in
fact they have just watched the train on the op-
posite side of the platform taking off. This phe-
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nomenon is termed vection, and everybody who
has had this experience will remember the mo-
ment of insight when a cue destroys the illusion
of  self-motion  and  we  realize  that  our  train
hasn’t budged. A more historical example of il-
lusions under natural conditions is the waterfall
illusion—,  a  type  of  motion  aftereffect.  After
looking  at  a  waterfall  or  flowing  water  for  a
long time, static objects, e.g., the river bank or
trees, seem to move in the direction opposite to
the  previously  perceived  water  flow,  probably
due to adaptation effects in brain regions pro-
cessing motion (Anstis et al. 1998). Early de-
scriptions of the effect have been attributed to
Aristotle (384–322 BCE) and Lucretius (99–55
BCE; Wade 1998). But apart from these few ex-
amples, it’s rarely the case that the constructive
nature of our perception is noticeable in every-
day life.
Illusions have become a part of our popu-
lar  culture  and have had a strong impact  on
art. A whole art movement in painting, Op Art,
is  based on using known and discovering new
visual illusions. It is a cultural version of vision
research, presenting the fascinating nature of il-
lusions to the public in aesthetically appealing
ways. Illusions also feature prominently in the
work  of  surrealist  painter  Salvador  Dalí  and
other modern artists. For such artists, the me-
dium presented  a  way of  expressing  the  con-
structive nature of  perception and signalled a
departure from realism. For painters in general,
knowledge about optics and the basis of visual
perception has always been important for guid-
ing  the  construction  process  of  paintings  and
the refinement of techniques in order to achieve
certain effects in the eye of the beholder. The
entwinement of science and art is scrutinized in
recent work looking at the interaction between
fields (Zeki 1999). Two other forms of art that
were more or less invented in close interaction
with science are photography and film-making.
The very basis of TV and movie presentations is
rooted in the fact that we are able to fuse a
rapid sequence of static images to construct a
natural impression of moving objects. TV dis-
plays,  projectors,  and  computer  screens  work
with a certain refresh rate at which subsequent
images are presented; the rate can be as low as
24  Hz  in  cinematography.  The  basic  phe-
nomenon that allows us to create a natural per-
ceptual flow from flickering images is referred to
as apparent motion, a type of illusory motion. 
Because  of  the  fascination  with  illusions
and its influence on culture, illusions have been
guiding research on visual perception for a long
time—and continue to do so. But this is not the
only reason for the utilization of illusions in sci-
ence.  Illusions  are  a  powerful  tool  for  under-
standing  mechanisms  of  sensory  processing  in
the brain that are unexpected or counterintuit-
ive. Many motion illusions where motion can be
seen in static displays (often seen in the enter-
tainment  sections  of  magazines)  depend  on  a
specific configuration of color values in directly
abutting picture elements. These configurations
of picture elements are repeated and cover the
entire display, in sum creating a striking motion
impression. Psychophysical experiments showed
that the key to the illusion is the configuration
of  neighboring  elements,  whose  effects  cannot
be predicted by current models of visual pro-
cessing. Additional neurophysiological measure-
ments in the same study demonstrated that dif-
ferent picture elements were processed with dif-
ferent  latencies  in  certain  areas  of  the  visual
cortex, mimicking a motion signal (Conway et
al. 2005). This suggested a neural explanation
for the occurrence of the illusion and led to a
revision of existing models of motion selectivity.
Another driving force for the use of illu-
sions in research was a resurgence of interest in
understanding conscious perception. At the be-
ginning of the 1990s, Francis Crick and Christof
Koch started to publish a sequence of concep-
tual papers advocating the investigation of con-
sciousness with empirical, and especially neuros-
cientific  methods  (Crick &  Koch 1990,  1995,
1998). Since then the number of papers on con-
sciousness has grown steadily in the domain of
cognitive  neuroscience.  Certain  visual  illusions
lend themselves specifically to investigating the
nature  of  conscious  processing.  Some  of  the
most prominent paradigms display the charac-
teristic  of  bistability  or  multistability:  When
presented to observers, conscious perception al-
ternates  between  two  (bistability)  or  multiple
(multistability)  interpretations  although  the
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physical  characteristics  of  the  display  do  not
change.  Rubin’s  face-vase  illusion  and  the
Necker  Cube  are  just  the  most  prominent
among a multitude of examples for multistabil-
ity (Kim & Blake 2005). The promise of using
multistability is that it allows for disentangling
the neural representation of the physical stimu-
lus characteristics from the processes giving rise
to  conscious  perception.  The  logic  of  the  ap-
proach is that changes in neural activity accom-
panying switches in subjective experience dur-
ing  constant  physical  stimulation  provide  a
guide  to  understanding  the  neural  underpin-
nings of consciousness.
2 Hecht’s criticism of the illusion concept
In his target article “Beyond illusions: On the
limitations of perceiving relational properties,”
Heiko Hecht (this collection) begins with a dis-
cussion of the traditional concept of illusion and
how it has been employed in the context of re-
search on vision. In its most basic sense, an illu-
sion refers to a difference between our repres-
entation of a given scene and its actual physical
properties. In an interesting take on the utility
of illusions in research, Hecht suggests that the
mere  discrepancy between our perception  and
the real world—what he calls  illusiond (“d” for
“discrepancy”)—is  less  useful  than  one  might
think. In simple terms, our perception is off to
some degree  in  many cases.  But  still,  on  the
other  hand it  is  amazing  how on-target  it  is
most of the time: it is sufficiently accurate for
an  effective  interaction  with  the  world.  For
Hecht,  the  term “illusion”  should  be  reserved
for situations when discrepancies (illusiond) are
manifest, i.e., when the error is part of the ex-
perience  and  we  become aware  of  it.  This  is
termed  illusionm (“m”  for  “manifest”)  and  is
supposed to be the more interesting case. The
moment of insight for the train-ride illusion de-
scribed above might be a good example. Inter-
preting relative motion between trains as self-
motion is often an adequate interpretation, but
the error is manifested in a striking fashion ex-
perientially when we spot a part of the platform
that indicates unmistakably that we are still in
the same place.
In addition to the distinction between illu-
siond and illusionm, Hecht is concerned with cog-
nitive illusions in comparison to the well-known
perceptual illusions. His interesting observation
is  that  when we move away from perception,
the  discrepancies  between  the  real  world  and
our judgments become even larger,  sometimes
to an absurd level. Humans are notoriously bad
at everyday physics. Hecht mentions that we see
nothing wrong with fabricated scenes that glar-
ingly  contradict  Newtonian  physics,  and  even
our spontaneous actions reveal the same degree
of error. Nevertheless, they are hardly ever no-
ticed, i.e.,  illusiond rarely becomes  illusionm in
the cognitive domain. That this is especially the
case  for  relational  properties  Hecht  demon-
strates with a series of his own experiments on
physics judgments by university students. Even
participants that should at least have some the-
oretical knowledge about the laws governing the
real  world  (physics  students)  are  surprisingly
bad at finding the right answers to quizzes on
balancing  beams  made  of  different  materials
with different weight distributions (Experiment
1) and on the slipperiness of surfaces (Experi-
ment 2). In these examples, the students’ judg-
ments are in stark contrast to the actual, real-
world  outcomes,  which  were  also  empirically
tested in addition to deriving predictions from
the  laws  of  physics.  So  even  though  the
paradigms were chosen to be experientially ac-
cessible and ecologically relevant, it seems that
our cognitive system does not care about cor-
rectness  or  even  rough  approximations  that
would point it in the right direction. Even the
mere  ordering  of  solutions  without  providing
quantitative details is seldom correct.
To  summarize,  Hecht  suggests  that  the
small  deviations  of  our  perceptual  representa-
tions are no match for the sometimes extreme
discrepancies found in the cognitive domain. Il-
lusiond is the norm rather than the interesting
exception  in  sensory  processing  because—at
least in vision—the full three-dimensional rep-
resentation of the world has to be derived from
a limited array of two-dimensional information
on the retinae.  Hecht (this collection) refers to
this as the “underspecification problem.” For an
efficient solution to the underspecification prob-
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lem, the system employs a range of assumptions
and constraints on the makeup of the world to
guide  the  reconstruction  process.  For  Hecht,
perception is therefore always fraught with cog-
nitive elements. This is even more so when dis-
crepancy  is  detected;  illusiond becomes  illu-
sionm. Then, cognitive judgments are involved,
and an explicit comparison process is initiated
that allows us to capture the discrepancy and
which makes it experientially available.
3 The role of illusions in vision research
Hecht provides compelling evidence for the er-
ror-prone nature of  everyday judgments,  espe-
cially  when  it  comes  to  relational  properties.
His observation of an antagonism between the
size of  discrepancies  and their  detectability  is
interesting. Moving from the perceptual to the
cognitive domain, the size of discrepancies in-
creases, but at the same time we are less likely
to  notice  those  errors.  But  there  are  a  few
points of dissent I would like to discuss in what
follows.  (1)  The  discussion  of  the  cognitive
nature of perception is long-standing and won’t
be solved in the near future, especially because
the  term “cognition”  is  notoriously  imprecise.
Nevertheless, I am not convinced that the cog-
nitive aspect that is supposed to be part of per-
ceptual as well as cognitive illusions in Hecht’s
view  is  a  necessary  ingredient  for  a  proper
concept of illusion. (2) Hecht’s arguments are a
welcome incentive to reflect upon the concept of
illusion and its role for research. Although he
does not negate the role of perceptual illusions
for vision research, he is rather critical concern-
ing the utility of traditional illusion research, es-
pecially with respect to the underspecification
problem. Drawing on the vast body of research
on apparent motion, I would like to provide an
example of a positive research program that has
accumulated valuable insights into the mechan-
isms underlying visual motion processing. This
is  not  necessarily  in  contradiction  to  Hecht’s
stance. The focus of research on illusions has fo-
cused more on the neural mechanisms of visual
processing and specifically on the neural correl-
ates of conscious perception. In this sense, the
research  lines  can  be  seen  as  complementary.
Nevertheless, I would argue in conclusion that
the term illusion is well anchored in the percep-
tual  domain  and  plays  an  important  guiding
role for research on visual processing.
There is a long tradition in vision research
of considering the influence of cognition on per-
ceptual processes. The basis for the early invest-
igations on vision and, more generally, on sens-
ory processing in the 19th century and early 20th
century was  the distinction between sensation
and  perception.  One  of  Helmholtz’s  (1863)
definitions captures the main line of thought: 
Empfindungen nennen wir  die  Eindrücke
auf  unsere  Sinne,  insofern  sie  uns  als
Zustände unseres Körpers (speciell unserer
Nervenapparate)  zum  Bewusstsein  kom-
men;  Wahrnehmungen  insofern  wir  uns
aus ihnen die Vorstellung äusserer Objecte
bilden.1
The definition can be seen as a continuation of
a philosophical tradition that has the intention
of  separating  pure  states  of  sensory reception
from the more cognitive aspects concerned with
the reconstruction of the outer world. Already
at this time, different authors were aware of the
fact that these definitions did not draw a clear
dividing line between different types of sensory
states.  For  example,  Sigmund Exner (1875)
refers  to  Helmholtz’s  definition  and points  to
several examples for which the distinction be-
comes muddled. His observant conclusion is that
the philosophical concepts do not fare well  in
the field of brain physiology and that contradic-
tions have to be resolved in future models  of
sensory processing (Exner 1875, p. 159). So des-
pite  its  initial  allure,  the  distinction  between
sensation and perception produced more prob-
lems than solutions.
An interesting recent model of the interac-
tion between perception and cognition has been
proposed by  Vetter &  Newen (2014). They re-
view the current empirical literature on cognit-
ive  penetration  of  perceptual  processing  and
1 English:  
“We call the impressions on our senses sensations, insofar as we be-
come aware of them as states of our body (especially of our nervous
system); we call them perceptions insofar as we create representa-
tions of external objects.” [My translation]
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find compelling evidence that cognitive penetra-
tion  of  perception  is  ubiquitous.  They  distin-
guish four stages of  processing in the sensory
(visual)  hierarchy:  (1)  basic  feature  detection,
(2) percept estimation, (3) learned visual pat-
terns,  and (4)  semantic  world knowledge.  Ac-
cording to their account, almost all possible in-
teractions between processing levels occur under
normal  conditions  and  top-down  connections
can be  considered forms of  cognitive  penetra-
tion.  They  argue  that  it’s  not  a  question  of
whether  cognition  influences  perception,  but
rather of what type of interaction takes place in
any  given  case.  They  advocate  a  move  away
from the general conceptual question of the cog-
nition-perception relationship towards an empir-
ically-based  consideration  of  the  interactions
between different levels of the processing hier-
archy.
Importantly, none of the stages character-
ized by Vetter & Newen (2014) capture the cog-
nitive component Hecht has in mind. The realiz-
ation that there is a discrepancy between per-
cept  and the  real  world  is  not  something  in-
volved  in  the  construction  of  the  perceptual
content itself. It seems that this it is more along
the lines of a metacognitive appraisal of the cur-
rent  situation.  With  reference  to  Metzinger’s
(2003b) concept of phenomenal transparency (a
naïve-realistic  stance  towards  the  perceived
world) referred to at the beginning of the com-
mentary, it is now the complementary feature of
phenomenal opacity—a situation in which the
representational  character  of  experience  be-
comes available to the subject—that might play
a role here. Metzinger (2003b) refers to cases of
lucid dreaming and drug-induced hallucinations
as prime examples of phenomenal opacity. Inter-
estingly, it is not sufficient for him that we have
accompanying reflexive thoughts on the nature
of perceptual representations (the “philosopher’s
stance”, as one could say), but we must also be
attentively engaged with the perceptual content
and recognize the illusory nature of the process.
Therefore, it seems to be the case that neither
the views of Vetter & Newen nor Metzinger’s
concept of phenomenal opacity seem to capture
the  cognitive  component  Hecht  has  in  mind.
But in my view, such models of cognitive penet-
ration are much more intimately linked with the
illusion concept, because they provide an under-
standing of how the very nature of the experi-
ence  is  modulated  by  cognitive  processes.
Hecht’s model doesn’t seem to capture that as-
pect, since it functions more as a cognitive com-
mentary  on  the  impenetrable  perceptual  pro-
cess.  It  is  unclear  why this  metacognitive ap-
praisal should be considered a hallmark of illus-
ory experiences.
When  Hecht  argues  for  abandoning  the
term  “illusion”  in  the  perceptual  domain,  he
also refers to Wertheimer’s classical work on ap-
parent  motion  (1912)  and  contends  that  the
Gestalt  psychologists  “avoided  the  term  illu-
sion” (Hecht this collection). It is true that, for
example,  Wertheimer (1912, pp. 167–168) him-
self  mentions  in  a  footnote  that  “illusion”
should not be used to refer to a discrepancy rel-
ative  to  the  physical  world  because  his  main
concern  is  with  mental  states.  (The  German
word  in  the  original  paper  is  “Täuschung,”
which is indeed best translated as “illusion” in
this context.)  Nevertheless,  the passage is  not
very clear on the reasons for rejecting the refer-
ence to discrepancy.  Again,  it  seems that the
distinction  between  sensation  and  perception
(see above) is lingering in the background. Even
assuming a correct sensory reception (sensation)
of  the apparent-motion inducers,  something is
added that goes beyond the raw sensory data.
In  a  later  section  of  the  paper  (Wertheimer
1912, p. 228), this becomes clearer when Wer-
theimer  analyzes  another  possible  meaning  of
“Täuschung,” i.e., failure of judgment (German:
“Urteilstäuschung”).  It  is  important  for  him
that apparent motion is not a result of cognitive
processes, of inferences of the type: “If an object
was there just before and now is over here, it
must  have  moved  between  the  points.”  He  is
convinced of the perceptual nature of the phe-
nomenon  and  rejects  the  idea  that  cognition
plays an important role. Again, there is  some
ambiguity with respect to the usage of the term
“illusion” here. This being said, throughout the
article  Wertheimer  uses  the  noun-form
“Täuschung” thirty-five times and also refers to
other motion illusions that were already as well
known  at  the  time  as  “Täuschung.”  On  my
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reading, his main intention was to prove that
apparent motion is the result of a low-level per-
ceptual process and that it is indeed illusory in
nature.
Wertheimer’s 1912 paper, with its detailed
psychophysical  investigation  of  the  apparent-
motion phenomenon is commonly considered to
be the founding event of the Gestalt movement
(cf.  Sekuler 1996;  Steinman et  al. 2000),  al-
though this might not be the complete picture
(Wertheimer 2014).  We  have  just  passed  the
centenary of Wertheimer’s seminal article, but
still there is much work to be done to provide a
complete  picture  of  the  processes  involved  in
apparent-motion perception at behavioral, com-
putational, and neurophysiological levels of de-
scription.  In  my  view,  apparent  motion  is  a
paradigmatic case of an illusiond that has fertil-
ized  the  understanding  of  motion  processing
and continues to do so. Given the roughly one
hundred years of research on apparent motion,
it is worthwhile to take stock (briefly) and see
where  investigations  associated  with  this
paradigm have taken us.
Psychophysical  investigations  of  apparent
motion are too numerous to review extensively
here.  Early  studies  focused  on  describing  the
basic features of the phenomenon.  Korte’s laws
(1915) are still  part of textbook knowledge in
vision  research;  he  described  the  influence  of
different  stimulus  characteristics  (stimulus
strength, spatial and temporal separation etc.)
on the quality of  apparent-motion perception.
New  varieties  of  apparent  motion  were  de-
scribed in the following,  one of  the most im-
portant  ones  being  the  motion  quartet
(Neuhaus 1930;  von  Schiller 1933;  see  video:
http://www.open-
mind.net/videomaterials/kohler-motion-quar-
tet). This is a bistable version of apparent mo-
tion, where two frames with diagonally oppos-
ing dots at the corners of a virtual rectangle are
flashed in alternation. The identical stimulus se-
quence can be interpreted as being in vertical or
horizontal motion. During longer presentations
of  the  unchanging stimulus,  conscious  percep-
tion will spontaneously switch between the pos-
sible alternatives.  It is therefore an important
example of a multistable display, which allows
various interpretations with the same physical
input. Early on, it was noticed that the integra-
tion of motion inducers in the motion quartet
processed within brain hemispheres is facilitated
relative  to  integration  between  hemispheres
(Gengerelli 1948), a fact we will come back to
later on. After a relative hiatus in the 50s and
60s, apparent motion again took center stage in
the 70s. It was the basis for the work of  Paul
Kolers (1972) on configuration effects  and for
the  first  investigation  of  computational  prin-
ciples of motion perception by  Shimon Ullman
(1979). At the same time, distinctions between
different types of apparent motion were intro-
duced (Anstis 1980; Braddick 1974, 1980), later
culminating  in  the  three-layered  hierarchical
system of motion types proposed by Lu & Sper-
ling (1995, 2001).
Currently, in all domains (psychophysical,
computational, neurophysiological) there are on-
going  research  endeavors  cross-fertilizing  each
other in the search for mechanisms underlying
illusory perception of motion. After the turn of
the millennium, the broad availability of brain-
imaging  methods  spurred  the  investigation  of
the neural mechanisms underlying apparent-mo-
tion perception. By and large, the same areas
that  process  real  motion  are  involved  in  the
(Muckli et al. 2002; Sterzer et al. 2003; Sterzer
et al. 2002; Sterzer & Kleinschmidt 2005), sup-
porting the assumption that results from stud-
ies  on apparent  motion can be transferred to
other types of motion processing. Another inter-
esting result from studies using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging was that traces of the
virtual apparent-motion path, the illusory mo-
tion between inducers, can already be seen in
the primary visual cortex, the earliest stage of
visual  cortical  processing  (Larsen et  al. 2006;
Muckli et al. 2005). This effect is probably me-
diated  through  feedback  connections  from
higher areas (Sterzer et al. 2006), explaining the
fact that normal visual functioning is disturbed
on the path of apparent motion (Yantis & Na-
kama 1998) and also supporting  Wertheimer’s
(1912) original claim that apparent motion is a
perceptual  phenomenon that  does not  depend
on cognitive inferences Animal studies are start-
ing  to  elucidate  the  more  fine-grained  neural
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mechanisms  subserving  apparent-motion  pro-
cessing. Neurophysiological investigations in the
animal model demonstrated complex wave pat-
terns  of  interactions  between  several  cortical
areas during the perception of apparent motion
(Ahmed et al. 2008). This work also inspired a
formal  model  of  these  interactions  elucidating
the  computational  principles  underlying  the
representation of apparent motion in the brain
(Deco & Roland 2010).
In my own recent research, I have specific-
ally looked at interindividual differences in the
perception of apparent motion and its anatom-
ical basis. As mentioned above, for the bistable
motion  quartet  there  is  a  difference  between
perceiving apparent motion in the vertical and
horizontal direction. Observers show a bias to-
wards perceiving vertical motion when they fix-
ate  on  the  middle  of  the  motion  quartet
(Chaudhuri & Glaser 1991). A possible explana-
tion for this is that due to the way the visual
field is represented in the visual cortex, vertical
motion  only  requires  integration  within  brain
hemispheres, but horizontal motion depends on
integration  between  hemispheres.  In  fact,  we
could demonstrate that  the individual  bias  of
observers of vertical motion could be partly pre-
dicted by the quality of the neural connections
between brain halves, suggesting that interhemi-
spheric integration is a relevant factor (Genç et
al. 2011).
The  very  short  summary  of  research  on
apparent  motion  demonstrates  the various  in-
sights  this  simple  paradigm has  inspired  over
the course of the last century and beyond. It led
to a detailed description of the involved brain
areas, including interindividual differences, and
to  processing  models  being  developed  on  the
computational and neurophysiological level. As
mentioned in the introductory section, one main
concern in vision research associated with illu-
sions is the interest in conscious perception and
the property of multistability. Both aspects are
also dominant in the apparent-motion field. The
current  state  of  research  is  just  the  starting
point for investigations towards a deeper under-
standing of  the exact  mechanisms.  Often,  the
results  are  still  descriptive  and  qualitative  in
nature and don’t allow for very specific predic-
tions with respect to the involved neural ma-
chinery and dynamics. Yet the research line is
promising  and  has  the  potential  to  lead  to
broadly applicable results. This might even be
the case for the underspecification problem, the
problem  of  reconstructing  a  full-fledged  3D
world from a limited 2D input—one of Hecht’s
main concerns. Multistability can be seen as one
paradigm case in which the nervous system has
to resolve ambiguity. For the Necker Cube, the
motion quartet, and other multistable displays,
the brain settles into a solution for a perceptual
problem by resolving competition among altern-
atives.  Therefore,  research  on  multistability
might  help  to  elucidate  the  core  mechanisms
that give rise to the definitive subjective inter-
pretations with which we represent the world.
4 Conclusion
In  conclusion,  Hecht’s  distinction  between  illu-
siond and illusionm and his criticism of the naïve
illusion concept in vision research is interesting.
When we become aware of illusions, when we sud-
denly recognize the virtual character of our sub-
jective world, certain metacognitive processes are
initiated that are a worthwhile subject matter for
further investigation. In some sense they become
part of the experience, and an important question
is whether and how the two aspects of the experi-
ence interact. Nevertheless, Hecht also agrees that
perceptual representations are relatively immune
to top-down control, i.e., even in the rare cases in
which  the  illusory  character  becomes  manifest,
the perceptual processes are mostly modular and
impenetrable in nature. Therefore, the question of
illusory representation can be tackled independ-
ently of the question of metacognitive awareness,
and continues to be an important guide for re-
search on visual processing. Apart from looking at
the  more  conceptual  question  of  the  level  at
which  the  term  “illusion”  should  be  applied,
which is moot to some degree, I have tried to
provide  examples  of  relevant  illusiond research
that has made progress on the question of how
the brain processes visual information. Even for
the underspecification problem, there is opportun-
ity  for  valuable  insight,  which  hasn’t  been  ex-
ploited to full potential yet in current research.
Kohler, A. (2015). The Illusion of the Given and Its Role in Vision Research - A Commentary on Heiko Hecht.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 18(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570528 7 | 9
www.open-mind.net
References
Ahmed, B., Hanazawa, A., Undeman, C., Eriksson, D.,
Valentiniene, S. & Roland, P. E. (2008). Cortical dy-
namics  subserving  visual  apparent  motion.  Cerebral
Cortex, 18 (12), 2796-2810. 10.1093/cercor/bhn038
Anstis, S. M. (1980). The perception of apparent move-
ment.  Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
of London Series  B:  Biological  Sciences,  290 (1038),
153-168. 10.1098/rstb.1980.0088
Anstis, S. M., Verstraten, F. A. J. & Mather, G. (1998).
The motion aftereffect. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2
(3), 111-117. 10.1016/S1364-6613(98)01142-5
Braddick, O. (1974). A short-range process in apparent
motion. Vision Research, 14 (7), 519-527.
10.1016/0042-6989(74)90041-8
 (1980). Low-level and high-level processes in ap-
parent motion. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society of  London Series B: Biological  Sciences,  290
(1038), 137-151. 10.1098/rstb.1980.0087
Chaudhuri, A. & Glaser, D. A. (1991). Metastable motion
anisotropy. Visual Neuroscience, 7 (5), 397-407.
10.1017/S0952523800009706
Conway, B. R., Kitaoka, A., Yazdanbakhsh, A., Pack, C.
C.  & Livingstone,  M.  S.  (2005).  Neural  basis  for  a
powerful  static  motion  illusion.  Journal  of  Neuros-
cience, 25 (23), 5651-5656. 
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1084-05.2005
Crick, F. & Koch, C. (1990). Some reflections on visual
awareness. Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitat-
ive Biology, 55, 953-962. 10.1101/SQB.1990.055.01.089
 (1995). Are we aware of neural activity in primary
visual cortex? Nature, 375 (6527), 121-123.
10.1038/375121a0
 (1998). Consciousness and neuroscience.  Cerebral
Cortex, 8 (2), 97-107. 10.1093/cercor/8.2.97
Deco, G. & Roland, P. (2010). The role of multi-area in-
teractions  for  the  computation  of  apparent  motion.
NeuroImage, 51 (3), 1018-1026.
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.03.032
Exner, S. (1875). Über das Sehen von Bewegungen und
die  Theorie  des  zusammengesetzten  Auges.  Sitzungs-
berichte  der  Akademie  der  Wissenschaften  Wien
(Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Klasse),  72 (3),
156-190. 
Gengerelli, J. A. (1948). Apparent movement in relation
to homonymous and heteronymous stimulation of the
cerebral hemispheres. Journal of Experimental Psycho-
logy, 38 (5), 592-599. 10.1037/h0062438
Genç, E., Bergmann, J., Singer, W. & Kohler, A. (2011).
Interhemispheric  connections shape subjective experi-
ence of bistable motion. Current Biology, 21 (17), 1494-
1499. 10.1016/j.cub.2011.08.003
Hecht, H. (2015). Beyond illusions: On the limitations of
perceiving relational properties. In T. Metzinger & J.
M. Windt (Eds.) Open MIND. Frankfurt a. M., GER:
MIND Group. 
Kim, C. Y. & Blake,  R. (2005).  Psychophysical  magic:
Rendering the visible “invisible.”.  Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 9 (8), 381-388. 10.1016/J.Tics.2005.06.012
Kolers, P. A. (1972).  Aspects of motion perception.  New
York, NY: Pergamon Press. 
Korte,  A.  (1915).  Kinematoskopische  Untersuchungen.
Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 72, 194-296. 
Larsen, A., Madsen, K. H., Lund, T. E. & Bundesen, C.
(2006). Images of illusory motion in primary visual cor-
tex.  Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,  18 (7), 1174-
1180. 10.1162/jocn.2006.18.7.1174
Lu, Z. L. & Sperling, G. (1995). Attention-generated ap-
parent motion. Nature, 377 (6546), 237-239.
10.1038/377237a0
 (2001). Three-systems theory of human visual mo-
tion  perception:  Review and  update.  Journal  of  the
Optical Society of America A, Optics, Image Science,
and Vision, 18 (9), 2331-2370.
10.1364/JOSAA.18.002331
Metzinger, T. (2003a). Being no one: The self-model the-
ory of subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 (2003b). Phenomenal transparency and cognitive
self-reference.  Phenomenology  and  the  Cognitive  Sci-
ences, 2 (4), 353-393.
10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007366.42918.eb
Muckli, L., Kriegeskorte, N., Lanfermann, H., Zanella, F.
E., Singer, W. & Goebel, R. (2002). Apparent motion:
Event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging of
perceptual  switches  and  states.  Journal  of  Neuros-
cience, 22 (9), RC219. 
Muckli,  L.,  Kohler,  A.,  Kriegeskorte,  N.  & Singer,  W.
(2005). Primary visual cortex activity along the appar-
ent-motion trace reflects illusory perception. PLoS Bio-
logy, 3 (8), e265. 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030265
Neuhaus,  W.  (1930).  Experimentelle  Untersuchung  der
Scheinbewegung.  Archiv  für  die  gesamte  Psychologie,
75, 315-458. 
Sekuler, R. (1996). Motion perception: A modern view of
Wertheimer’s  1912  monograph.  Perception,  25 (10),
1243-1258. 10.1068/p251243
Steinman, R. M., Pizlo, Z. & Pizlo, F. J. (2000). Phi is
Kohler, A. (2015). The Illusion of the Given and Its Role in Vision Research - A Commentary on Heiko Hecht.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 18(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570528 8 | 9
www.open-mind.net
not beta, and why Wertheimer’s discovery launched the
Gestalt  revolution.  Vision  Research,  40 (17),  2257-
2264. 10.1016/S0042-6989(00)00086-9
Sterzer, P., Russ, M. O., Preibisch, C. & Kleinschmidt, A.
(2002). Neural correlates of spontaneous direction re-
versals in ambiguous apparent visual motion. NeuroIm-
age, 15 (4), 908-916. 10.1006/nimg.2001.1030
Sterzer,  P.,  Eger,  E.  &  Kleinschmidt,  A.  (2003).  Re-
sponses of extrastriate cortex to switching perception
of  ambiguous  visual  motion  stimuli.  Neuroreport,  14
(18), 2337-2341. 10.1097/01.wnr.0000102554.45279.a3
Sterzer,  P.,  Haynes,  J.-D.  & Rees,  G.  (2006).  Primary
visual cortex activation on the path of apparent motion
is mediated by feedback from hMT+/V5. NeuroImage,
32 (3), 1308-1316. 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.05.029
Sterzer, P. & Kleinschmidt, A. (2005). A neural signature
of colour and luminance correspondence in bistable ap-
parent motion.  European Journal of Neuroscience,  21
(11), 3097-3106. 10.1111/j.1460-9568.2005.04133.x
Ullman, S. (1979).  The interpretation of visual motion.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Vetter, P. & Newen, A. (2014). Varieties of cognitive pen-
etration in visual perception.  Consciousness and Cog-
nition, 27, 62-67. 10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.007
von Helmholtz,  H.  (1863).  Die Lehre  von den Tonem-
pfindungen, als physiologische Grundlage für die The-
orie der Musik. Braunschweig, GER: Vieweg. 
von  Schiller,  P.  (1933).  Stroboskopische  Alternativver-
suche. Psychologische Forschung, 17 (1), 179-214.
10.1007/BF02411959
Wade,  N. J.  (1998).  A natural history of vision.  Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Wertheimer, M. (1912). Experimentelle Studien über das
Sehen von Bewegung.  Zeitschrift  für Psychologie,  61,
161-265. 
 (2014).  Music,  thinking,  perceived  motion:  The
emergence of Gestalt theory. History of Psychology, 17
(2), 131-133. 10.1037/a0035765
Yantis,  S. & Nakama, T. (1998). Visual interactions in
the path of apparent motion.  Nature Neuroscience,  1
(6), 508-512. 10.1038/2226
Zeki, S. (1999).  Inner vision: An exploration of art and
the brain. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Kohler, A. (2015). The Illusion of the Given and Its Role in Vision Research - A Commentary on Heiko Hecht.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 18(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570528 9 | 9
